The States of Zealand to the Queen.
All the prisoners, as well the gentlemen of quality as those
of the common sort, agree that their intent was, with the aid and forces of the
Prince of Parma, to attack England straightway, there being embarked in Spain
about 40,000 men, viz., 20,000 soldiers volunteers, 10,000 constrained to
serve, and 12,000 mariners. And to this end the said prince still holdeth his
army in readiness, to the number of 25,000 men, with ships full of saddles,
bridles, boots, spurs, and everything needful for such an enterprise. It is
reported that the King of Spain should have sent him the crown and sceptre of
England blessed by the Pope, and that he should have been made king if the
enterprise had met with good success; and truly he hath much correspondence in
the country, and receiveth certain advertisements therefrom.
* * *
From
Middelburg, the 16th of August, 1588.
Your
Majesty's most humble and
must
obedient servants
The Council
of the States of Zealand,
and by their order[1]
On August 7, H. Seymour reported the frustration of the
duke of Parma to Francis Walsigham: “It seemeth the Duke is in a great chafe to
see his ships no readier at Dunkirk, also to find such discomfiture of the
Spanish fleet hard by his nose.”
Next we provide the Duke of Parma’s report of December 30
to Don Juan de Idiaquez, personal secretary to King Philip II, attempting to
rebut the attempts of Spanish commanders to shift blame for the disastrous
failure of the invasion underwritten by the Spanish King. Vast amounts from the Spanish treasury had
been spent upon an operation that was a debacle on every level. In the process,
the Duke provides a detailed account of the scene at the staging ground for the
invasion.
Duke of Parma to Don Juan de Idiaquez.
Your worship does me infinite honour in desiring to
know from me the real truth as to the date when this army could have been ready
to sail, if weather had permitted and the Armada had performed its task. I will
reply frankly and freely to, your question. Notwithstanding all that has been
said, or may be said, by ignorant people, or those who maliciously raise doubts
where none should exist, I will say that on the 7th August, when Secretary
Arceo came and I left Bruges, I saw already embarked at Nieuport 16,000 foot soldiers;
and when I arrived at Dunkirk on Tuesday, the 8th, before dawn, the men who
were to be shipped there had arrived, and their embarcation was commenced. They
would all have been on board with the stores and the rest, as everything was
ready, and the shipping was going on very rapidly, if the embarcation had not
been suspended in consequence of the intelligence received of the Armada. But
for this they might well have begun to get out of port that night, and have
joined those from Nieuport during next day, so that together they could have
fulfilled their task, as nothing necessary was lacking. It is true that, in
consequence of the number of infantry having been increased, there was very
little room for the cavalry, there being only 20 rafts for them, unless the
Armada could aid us with accommodation for the rest, as those who had come from
the duke of Medina Sidonia said they thought there would be no difficulty in
doing. Even if this had been impossible we should have tried to send the rest
of the cavalry over in the other boats, and no time would have been lost in the
principal task, and in taking a port for the Armada in the Channel of London.
If for your greater satisfaction, and my justification, you would like to see certificates
and sworn depositions of all the magistrates, commanders of troops, and seamen, with regard
to the readiness of victuals and stores, etc., I will most willingly send them.
You may truly believe that when I told the Duke that only three days would be
required for the embarcation and preparations for sailing, I did not speak lightly
; and I should have effected it in less time than I said, with God's help. I
will not enlarge here on the causes and reasons that prevented me from going to
the coast earlier than I did, as I have already stated them, and they may be
well guessed. The men and stores, moreover, were so completely ready for
shipment, that I felt confident they would be put on board rapidly. There was
no need even to supply water to the boats, whatever some people may say, as no
cooking was required for so short a passage, and there was plenty of beer to
drink. It was also not necessary, as others imagine, to waste time in shipping
artillery on tlie warships, as we counted on the support of the Armada. The
omission to do this beforehand was hot negligence but artifice: and this is the
simple truth which you may stand to.—Brussels, 30th December 1588.[2]
A great many rumors were in the air. Most of which favored the Spanish. Ships from the Armada
were still alternately being reported both as lost and as limping back toward
home. Hopes were indulged of fomenting an Irish uprising with ships hiding from
the English off of that coast. Even of raising a force in Scotland to march on
England. Reason soon made clear that such hopes were impossible for all they persisted.
[1] State papers relating to the defeat of the Spanish Armada, anno 1588 (1894), II.51.
[2] Calendar
of Letters and State Papers Relating to English Affairs (1899), IV.502.
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